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Kant’s Ethics of Grace: Perspectival
Solutions to the Moral Difficulties
with Divine Assistance
Stephen Palmquist / Hong Kong Baptist University
i. does kant have an ethics of grace?
Throughout most of the history of Kant interpretation, the Sage of
Ko¨nigsberg has been portrayed either as a philosopher without any
serious interest in religion1 or as one who sought to bolster an essen-
tially secular moral philosophy by reducing religion to nothing but eth-
ical conduct.2 When such interpreters turn to Kant’s Religion within the
Bounds of Bare Reason (1793),3 they typically ignore or explain away his
references to divine assistance (e.g., 44–45) and his arguments that our
practical need to believe in God justifies a believer’s hope that a morally
1 For a recent example of this common tendency, see George di Giovanni, Freedom and
Religion in Kant and His Immediate Successors: The Vocation of Humankind, 1774–1800 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 203–4.
2 For a recent defense of Kantian ethics as explicitly “secular,” see Jeanine Grenberg, Kant
and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005). Patrick Frierson effectively rebuts this portrayal of Kant in “Corruption,
Non-ideal Theory, and Grace: A Response to Kant and the Ethics of Humility,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 75, no. 3 (November 2007): 624–31, but opines in conclusion that
Kant’s own satisfaction with his appeal to grace “is not clear” (631). For a detailed history
and thorough discussion of the reductionist interpretation of Kant’s philosophy of religion,
together with an explanation of why it is mistaken, see Stephen R. Palmquist, Kant’s Critical
Religion: Volume Two of Kant’s System of Perspectives (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), chap. 6, revised
and reprinted from “Does Kant Reduce Religion to Morality?” Kant-Studien 83, no. 2 (1992):
129–48.
3 Quotations from Kant’s book Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (hereafter Religion)
are from Werner S. Pluhar’s translation (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009). References cite the
original German pagination provided in the translation’s margins. This edition’s literal trans-
lation of Kant’s word Stu¨ck as “Piece” to label the four main divisions of Religion is superior
to alternatives such as “book” or “part,” for it highlights Kant’s likely reason for choosing this
unusual word: the book’s four essays were originally to be published as separate journal articles,
or “Pieces.” Kant uses Stu¨ck to refer explicitly to a journal publication in Religion, 23n.
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attuned divine being exists.4 This has given rise to a widespread ten-
dency to assume, even among those who think Kant wanted to take
empirical religions seriously, that his philosophy leaves no room for
grace, especially in its Christian form as an expression of God’s for-
giveness of sin through vicarious atonement. Any semblance of grace,
according to this common view, is rendered ineffectual by Kant’s alleg-
edly Pelagian emphasis on salvation by works.5
Some scholars in the past few decades have challenged this histori-
cally prevalent tendency in various ways. An initial, qualified challenge
came in two articles by Philip Quinn. The first examines the relevant
passages of Religion, portraying Kant’s theory of atonement as focusing,
like Anselm’s, on the need to satisfy divine justice.6 While praising Kant
for avoiding some pitfalls that plague Anselm’s approach, Quinn also
raises two “serious objections” against Kant, concluding that Kant leaves
us in a muddle over how vicarious atonement actually works.7 In a se-
quel, Quinn recounts his understanding of Kantian grace, expanding
his objections by noting certain inconsistencies between Kant’s theory
of “saving faith” and Christian understandings of vicarious atonement.8
As I shall argue in Section IV, interpreting Kant’s position as an ethics
of grace effectively neutralizes Quinn’s allegation that Kant adopts a
position antithetical to orthodox Christian faith.
A more robust defense of Kantian grace appeared in an article by
Jacqueline Marin˜a,9 who offers “an analysis of the deep structure of
4 For a detailed analysis of one such “religious argument” for God’s existence, an argument
often overlooked even by readers sympathetic with Kant’s religious tendencies, see Stephen
Palmquist, “Kant’s Religious Argument for the Existence of God—the Ultimate Dependence
of Human Destiny on Divine Assistance,” Faith and Philosophy 26 (January 2009): 3–22. For
an exhaustive treatment of the role hope plays in Religion, see Sidney Axinn, The Logic of Hope:
Extensions of Kant’s View of Religion (Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, 1994).
5 One of many typical examples is Garrett Green, “Kant’s Christian Apologetic,” in Papers
of the Nineteenth Century Theology Working Group, vol. 19, ed. Andrew Burgess, Joseph Pickle,
and Hans Schwarz (Colorado Springs: Colorado College, 1993), 7. The most influential text
arguing that Kant cannot consistently defend an orthodox concept of grace is John R. Silber,
“The Ethical Significance of Kant’s Religion,” in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans.
T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), cxxxi.
6 Philip L. Quinn, “Christian Atonement and Kantian Justification,” Faith and Philosophy 3,
no. 4 (October 1986): 440–62.
7 Ibid., 441.
8 Philip L. Quinn, “Saving Faith from Kant’s Remarkable Antinomy,” Faith and Philosophy
7, no. 4 (October 1990): 418–33.
9 Jacqueline Marin˜a, “Kant on Grace: A Reply to His Critics,” Religious Studies 33, no. 4
(1997): 379–400. Among the many other recent scholars who have contributed to this affir-
mative, grace-friendly way of interpreting Kantian theology and philosophy of religion are
John E. Hare (The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God’s Assistance [Oxford:
Clarendon, 1996]) and Stephen R. Palmquist (Kant’s Critical Religion). See also the essays by
fourteen interpreters who adopt various types of affirmative approach, collected in Chris L.
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Kant’s views on divine justice and grace” that shows Kant’s position, far
from being Pelagian, to be consistent with “an authentically Christian
understanding.”10 Quoting from a wide variety of Kant’s texts, Marin˜a
demonstrates that for Kant “divine justice is punitive and not remuner-
ative”: because human beings are never entirely good and because God
wills the happiness of all, any happiness we enjoy is a sign of “unmerited
grace.”11 The good life conduct Kant emphasizes in Religion does not
earn a person the right to divine grace but only makes one receptive
to a gift God must freely give (if it is to be available at all). Carefully
distinguishing between grace in general and two, more specific types
of Kantian grace, Marin˜a defends Kant’s argument against the specific
objections raised by Quinn and by several other interpreters less sym-
pathetic to Kant’s approach.
Yet old habits die hard, for, despite the persuasiveness of Marin˜a’s
defense of Kantian grace against the charges of unorthodoxy and/or
incoherence, some interpreters have continued to portray Kant’s the-
ory as an empty shell with little or no relevance to the concerns of
actual religious believers. What is missing from previous interpretations
such as those of Quinn and Marin˜a, I shall argue, is a clear awareness
that one of Kant’s central aims is to assess and resolve the ethical dif-
ficulties that arise for any theology of grace, not to develop his own
theoretical account of how grace might occur.
The tendency to misread Kant as proposing a theology of grace, and
to find him wanting as a result, is nowhere better illustrated than in
Peter Byrne’s recent book Kant on God. While granting the affirmative
interpreters’ claim that Kant sometimes clearly tries to make room for
divine grace, Byrne also echoes the conventional claim that Kant never
unequivocally defends this important feature of religious belief. He dis-
tinguishes between three types of grace—distributive, transforming,
and justifying—that operate in Kant’s writings.12 In the Dialectic of the
second Critique Kant portrays God as distributing happiness (presum-
ably, to justified believers) according to each person’s inner disposition,
Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist, eds., Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2006). Most notable among them is Philip Rossi’s essay, “Reading
Kant through Theological Spectacles” (chap. 5), where Marin˜a’s interpretation is compared
positively to that of various Catholic theologians.
10 Marin˜a, “Kant on Grace,” 380.
11 Ibid., 382.
12 Peter Byrne, Kant on God (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 140. Byrne’s lengthy discussion of
Kant’s theory of divine grace appears on 139–51. By contrast, Robert Merrihew Adams (“In-
troduction” to Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, trans. George di
Giovanni [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], xxi–xxiii) distinguishes between
prevenient, sanctifying, and justifying grace, claiming that Kant rejects the first, accepts the
second, and gives a “cautious embrace” to the third.
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not according to outward conduct. Byrne devotes most of his attention
to examining this type of grace, with its close association to Kant’s
moral argument for God’s existence—a central focus of Byrne’s book.
Of the three types, Byrne thinks only distributive grace does “any real
work” for Kant, yet this type relates mainly to technical issues arising
out of the second Critique.13 Byrne acknowledges that Kant’s appeal to
the other two types, mainly in Religion, sets him apart from Enlighten-
ment deists, but he regards this appeal as nonessential to the concerns
of Kant’s Critical System.14 In what follows I shall challenge this claim
by examining how Kant solves three ethical difficulties that arise out of
any belief in divine assistance, including his own account in Religion’s
Second Piece. Kant’s treatment of these difficulties suggests that the
grace discussed in Religion is distinct from (and does not necessarily
entail) the distribution of happiness in proportion to virtue that plays
such a crucial role in the second Critique. Examining the details of
Byrne’s distributive grace is therefore irrelevant to our present con-
cerns.15 However, I shall return to his qualified dismissal of Kantian
grace in Section IV when I assess the practical relevance that Kant’s
ethics of grace has for ordinary religious believers.
Because appealing to grace presupposes belief in sin, and sin is often
treated as a philosophically objectionable belief, some readers expect
Kant to show no serious interest in grace. Yet in the First Piece Kant
13 Byrne, Kant on God, 138–51. Byrne uses this phrase repeatedly throughout his section on
grace. I shall discuss the “work” done by Kant’s alleged appeal to distributive grace in a
subsequent footnote.
14 Ibid., 169–70. Earlier, Byrne admits, apparently with the recent affirmative interpreters
in mind, that for Kant “there might be a role for transforming grace in relation to the problem
of radical evil”; but he thinks Kant’s solution to this problem “is not talking about transforming
grace at all” (148). Byrne’s dismissal of the relevance of Kant’s appeal to transforming and
justifying grace results from his focus on Kant’s moral argument; yet we must cast our net
wider in the Critical System to see the relevance of these other types of grace.
15 As Byrne admits (Kant on God, 141), Kant himself does not actually use the term “grace”
in the second Critique to refer to the distribution of happiness to moral agents in proportion
to the extent of their virtue. It is therefore debatable whether Kant would regard Byrne’s
“distributive grace” as an example of grace at all—though Byrne provides some fascinating
arguments for reading Kant in this way (see 141, 148–49). If, for Kant, such distribution has
more to do with satisfying divine justice than with the dispensation of (unmerited) divine
grace, this would explain why he never calls it “grace.” This possibility, together with the fact
that nearly all the evidence Byrne amasses for seeing a doctrine of distributive grace operative
in Religion comes from the First Piece and is part of Kant’s explanation of the religious
implications of radical evil, justifies my decision to ignore this aspect of Byrne’s treatment of
Kantian grace. In saying it is irrelevant to our present concerns, I am not staking any claim
(positive or negative) regarding the merits of Byrne’s discussion of distributive grace. Rather,
I am merely pointing out that the present article is not about radical evil, but about how to
resolve the ethical difficulties that arise for anyone who believes in divine grace. Kant’s dis-
cussion of what Byrne calls distributive grace in the second Critique makes no mention of
such difficulties.
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defends a position he explicitly describes as expressing essentially the
same meaning as the Christian doctrine of original sin.16 The crucial
difference, Kant claims, is that the latter typically refers to the origin
of evil in time (i.e., identifying who the first sinner was), whereas his
theory of the “evil propensity” that infects human nature at its root is
about the origin of evil in reason (Religion, 39–44). He claims our de-
cision-making capacity—our rational power to make free choices—in-
evitably tends to be grounded in a preference for choosing evil, starting
from our first choice.17 This stance, properly understood, requires Kant
to appeal to grace in the Second Piece; as he predicts near the end of
the First Piece (44–47), divine assistance may be necessary to release
human beings from the self-deception caused by the radical evil that
inevitably infects our reason. Why, then, does Kant step lightly around
any direct appeal to grace when constructing his arguments in the Sec-
ond Piece?
Kant’s noncommittal treatment of grace stems directly from his fun-
damental claim, upheld throughout the three Critiques, that practical
reason has priority over theoretical reason.18 The ethical implications
of being religious (i.e., the practical outcome of adopting a given set
of religious beliefs and practices) therefore matter to Kant far more
than the abstract, metaphysical status of any theological doctrine. Con-
sistent with this principle, we find throughout Religion, especially in the
Second Piece (e.g., 62), that Kant repeatedly warns his readers of the
ethical dangers that may arise for those who conceive of religion as
requiring elements that go beyond the duty to follow a good way of
life. Whatever else authentic religion may be, according to Kant, it must
not become an excuse for moral laziness or immoral behavior (by ei-
ther individuals or groups of alleged “believers”). In particular, he
warns (66–78) that believers who ground their hope of salvation en-
16 In Religion, Kant says: “The way of conceiving that Scripture employs to depict the origin
of evil as a beginning of evil in the human genus agrees quite well with the above [i.e., with
Kant’s theory of the rational origin of evil]; for Scripture presents this origin in a story where
that which by the nature of the case (without taking the time condition into account) must
be thought as [being] first appears as first in time” (41).
17 This evil propensity has the same (transcendental) status in relation to the possibility of
religion as space and time have in relation to empirical knowledge. Because human nature
has a predisposition to good, we must presuppose the presence of an evil propensity in all
human beings to explain how even one person could choose evil. See Stephen R. Palmquist,
“Kant’s Quasi-Transcendental Argument for a Necessary and Universal Evil Propensity in
Human Nature,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 46, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 261–97, for a detailed
analysis of the structure of Kant’s argument along these lines.
18 The key texts on the primacy of practical reason are Critique of Pure Reason, 825–32 (“B”
edition), Critique of Practical Reason, 119–21, and Critique of Judgment, 171–73 (pagination is
from the Berlin Academy edition).
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tirely on the claim that God will change (or has supernaturally
changed) them from being morally corrupt to being morally “good”
are likely to fall victim to three religious illusions, whose basic features
we shall review in Section II.
One of Kant’s chief concerns in the Second Piece, entitled “On the
Struggle of the Good [Principle] with the Evil Principle for Dominion
over the Human Being” (Religion, 57), is to warn religious readers of
the dangers of such self-deceptions. A person’s evil propensity does not
go away simply because he or she affirms a religious creed (e.g., 93–94);
or, in response to one who believes God’s grace does take away a per-
son’s evil propensity, Kant points out (67–71) that we can never know
for certain that such a wholesale transformation has actually taken
place in any given individual’s case.19 For ethical reasons alone, Kant
thinks religious people ought to be cautious in affirming any specific
theoretical doctrines about divine assistance.
Those who succumb to such religious illusions are likely to follow
what Kant describes in the Third and Fourth Pieces as false religion.
Yet his cautious treatment of how one ought to believe in divine assis-
tance does not mean he positively rejects grace. A careful reading of
the Second Piece reveals that Kant is aiming to reform the believer’s
understanding of grace rather than destroy it. Kant’s goal is to reinter-
pret the Christian doctrine of grace in a way that renders it both phil-
osophically coherent and ethically empowering, just as he claimed to
do for the doctrine of original sin in the First Piece.20 The goal of the
First and Second Pieces, taken together, is to establish that, without
belief in an ethically empowering conception of divine grace, ethical
goodness becomes an impossible task. Kant’s arguments in the main
passage where he addresses the three difficulties that tend to arouse
illusory forms of religious belief (Religion, 66–78) are often dismissed
by interpreters as (at best) poorly argued or (at worst) nonsensical.21
19 Marin˜a (“Kant on Grace”) deals with this thorny issue in dialogue with Quinn (see, e.g.,
386–87), concluding that the issue is ultimately irrelevant: Kant’s position is that if one
conceives of grace as a unilateral divine act that entirely does away with the evil propensity,
then “we cannot really do anything with such an understanding of grace” (387).
20 See n. 16 above.
21 For example, in his writings on Kant’s philosophy of religion, Gordon Michalson’s stan-
dard approach is to portray Kant as responding to differing influences (such as Christian
theology and Newtonian physics) that are ultimately incompatible. Armed with this assump-
tion, Michalson finds irreconcilable “wobbles” throughout Kant’s text. For Michalson’s treat-
ment of the three difficulties (though readers unfamiliar with Kant’s text might have little
awareness from Michalson’s presentation that Kant presents them as three distinct problems),
see Fallen Freedom: Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1990), 110–24.
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Such assessments arise when interpreters neglect the thoroughly per-
spectival character of Kant’s philosophy, remaining closed to what Mar-
in˜a calls the “deep structure” of his arguments.22
Kant’s main purpose in section one of Religion’s Second Piece is to
explain the conditions we must fulfill in order to overcome the effect
our evil propensity has on our moral character. Adopting the transcen-
dental perspective, the First Piece portrayed radical evil as the bound-
ary condition that initially gives rise to the need for religion.23 The
Second Piece then adopts the logical perspective to explain how the
internal presence of a divine Word (λo´γo), or “archetype,” can em-
power religious believers to return the good principle to its rightful
place of sovereignty over the will. Subsection A (Religion, 60–62) argues
that bare reason recognizes in itself an unfulfilled need that can be met
only by this λo´γo taking on human form, as a perfect example of moral
goodness. Subsection B (62–66) argues that, because human beings are
aware of this need and can identify such an example, this archetype
must be an internal reality that can empower a person to effect a con-
version from evil heartedness to good. Although human beings may
need a real historical example of an ideal person in order to be aware
of this inner power, authentic religion calls each person to become
such an example of goodness. Reconciling this need with the three
illusions that tend to accompany any belief in grace is Kant’s central
task in subsection C (67–78), where he defends what I am here calling
his “ethics of grace.”
ii. the tendency of grace to encourage moral laziness
Although only three of the thirty-nine occurrences of “grace” (Gnade
or Gnaden) and its equivalents in Religion appear in subsection C, this
is where we find Kant’s most thorough discussion of the ethical dangers
confronting a person who believes in divine grace. Kant’s arguments
in this passage are typically not regarded as successfully defending a
doctrine of grace because he never focuses on, or clearly explains from
God’s perspective, how grace is actually implemented. This apparent
omission ceases to be disconcerting, once we recognize that he is here
not constructing a theology but an ethics of grace: a philosophical de-
fense of how a person can choose to believe in divine assistance without
22 For a thoroughgoing examination of this aspect of Kant’s philosophy, see Stephen R.
Palmquist, Kant’s System of Perspectives: An Architectonic Interpretation of the Critical Philosophy
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993).
23 For more detail on how Kant’s four main perspectives can be correlated to the four main
divisions of Religion, see Palmquist, Kant’s Critical Religion, chap. 7.
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thereby becoming morally lazy and of why a person might choose such
practical faith rather than trust solely in the merits of good life
conduct.24
Kant’s ethics of grace, his explanation of the proper relationship be-
tween grace and virtue, reaches a climax near the end of section one,
where he reveals that the whole topic of subsection C concerns “that
surplus beyond the merit of works” (75) that “is a merit that is imputed
to us by grace.” He then summarizes his foregoing argument (75–76):25
For that what, in our case . . . is always only in [a state of] mere becoming
(namely, to be a human being pleasing to God) should be imputed to us as if
we were already in full possession of it here—to this, after all, we surely have
(according to empirical self-cognition) no legal claim* insofar as we are ac-
quainted with ourselves in that way (gauge our disposition not directly but only
according to our deeds), so that the prosecutor within us would still be more
likely to propose a judgment of condemnation. It is therefore always only a
verdict of grace, although fully in conformity with eternal justice (as based on
a satisfaction thereof which for us resides only in the idea of the improved
disposition but with which God alone is acquainted), when we for the sake of
that good in our faith are unburdened of all responsibility.
Kant’s footnote to the quoted paragraph defines grace as “the decree
of a superior to bestow a good for which the subordinate has nothing
but the (moral) receptivity” (75n). Here, and only here in subsection
C, does Kant explicitly define grace. But this need not be treated as an
oversight, if his purpose in these pages is not to theologize, but to
explain how one can believe in such a decree without becoming ethi-
cally lazy.
As I noted in Section I, Kant argues in subsection A that an “arche-
type” within every person provides an idea or image of what living a
life of constant dependence on the “good principle” would entail and
that faith in this archetype can empower us to overcome the debilitat-
ing influence of the radical evil infecting our nature as rational beings
who are free, yet also products of physical nature. Subsection B assesses
the proper role of examples in such “practical faith” (Religion, 62): that
24 Di Giovanni claims Kant “was remarkably indifferent to religion” and an “atheist, for all
practical purposes” (Freedom and Religion in Kant, 203). That Kant tended to ignore traditional
religious beliefs and practices “in his private life” (204) di Giovanni interprets as stemming
from “righteous self-assurance,” rather than being a legitimate expression of his revolutionary
view of what true religion is all about, as I shall argue in the remainder of the article. For
my refutation of the claim that “Kant’s intention” was “to contain the sacred within the
boundaries of reason” (204), see my review of di Giovanni’s book in Kant-Studien 101, no. 1
(2010): 137–41.
25 Wherever Pluhar has “attitude” for Kant’s technical term Gesinnung, I use the more
conventional “disposition.”
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we can identify perfection in another person, such as Jesus, means we
must first possess the idea of a perfect person within ourselves; so each
person must strive to make oneself that perfect example. In this con-
text, subsection C examines three “Difficulties Opposing the Reality of
This Idea” (66) of an inner archetype of perfection that we can call
upon to empower our ethical decision making. Solving these difficulties
forms the core of Kant’s account of why rational persons who wish to
be good cannot depend merely on their own conduct but are better
off appealing to divine grace. However, if calling upon this all-impor-
tant idea itself becomes a form of self-deception, only weakening a per-
son’s moral resolve instead of strengthening it, then practical reason
would be forced to discard the archetype, and all religion based on
such an idea would be a dead end—at least as far as its goal of empow-
ering ethical behavior is concerned.
What, then, are the three ethical difficulties Kant is so worried about?
They are well known, as Kant’s account of each is frequently summa-
rized in the literature;26 because our focus here is on how Kant solves
these difficulties, a brief initial paraphrase of each illusion, and the
difficulty it creates, will suffice. First, believers in grace tell themselves
they are “saved,” yet they often continue to behave in a way that a good
God would regard as morally deficient. How could God overlook the
evil deeds a believer continues to commit, after conversion? Divine as-
sistance to those who are saved by grace seems to require God to turn
a blind eye to real evil, thus inadvertently encouraging religious people
to continue doing evil with a clear conscience, in the belief that God
sees them as “good” regardless of how bad their conduct may be. If this
is what grace entails, then the idea of an archetype of perfection ob-
viously lacks “reality” (Religion, 66) inasmuch as it thwarts the practical
goal it claims to reach. Kant’s portrayal of grace attempts to solve this
problem.
26 Accurately paraphrasing these difficulties requires an awareness of how they correspond
to the traditional theological doctrines of justification, eternal assurance, and sanctification.
Two early summaries worth consulting are Allen W. Wood’s Kant’s Moral Religion (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1970), 233–35; and Ronald M. Green’s Religious Reason: The Rational
and Moral Basis of Religious Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 86–88. See also
Patrick Frierson, Freedom and Anthropology in Kant’s Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 114–22. Hare’s summary correlates Kant’s three difficulties to the
persons of the Trinity and to the distinction between past, present, and future (Moral Gap,
53–56); emphasizing these theoretical issues instead of Kant’s ethics of grace, Hare ends up
joining those who regard Kant’s attempt to solve the difficulties as a “failure” (60). Adams
includes a helpful discussion of Kantian justification and grace (“Introduction,” xv–xxv).
Although he never mentions the three difficulties, Adams does acknowledge their core con-
cern: Kant thinks moral faith needs to appeal to grace, yet “fears the concept of grace for
the potential he sees in it for a corrupt relaxation of the stern demands of morality” (xxi).
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Second, an alleged certainty of having been declared blameless be-
fore God, now and forever, may lead to moral laziness even among
those who really have become good in God’s eyes, causing them to
lapse into a way of life that a good God could not possibly endorse.
Can religious believers know for certain that God has assisted them in
an eternally efficacious way? Many people claim such absolute certainty;
but if this is possible, to the extent that even God could not “unsave”
such persons, then what would prevent grace-filled believers from fall-
ing back into the evil ways that necessitated their conversion in the first
place? Any theory of divine assistance that leads to such an outcome,
including Kant’s own theory of the archetype, would encourage belief
in something that lacks reality, at least for the practical (ethical) pur-
pose of becoming a better person.
Third and perhaps most dangerously deceptive of all, believers might
think they are no longer responsible for their preconversion life, be-
cause God has forgiven them for their past evil. This understanding of
divine grace lies at the core of Christian theology, so Kant’s assessment
is historically accurate when he says it offers the “greatest” challenge
(Religion, 71) to anyone attempting to construct an ethics of grace. How
can a good God forgive evil deeds done prior to a person’s conversion
without wholly ignoring the requirements of justice implied by the moral
law? Christianity teaches, and Kant sometimes affirms (e.g., 73–77), that
the only way to conceive of God as forgiving believers for preconversion
evil is for someone else to be punished for that evil. Yet Kant assumes
(without argument) that an ethical interpretation of religion requires
each person to be responsible for his or her own choices. Belief in vi-
carious atonement would therefore seem to destroy the practical reality
of the idea that religious believers themselves become perfect through
their faith in the inner archetype. If it is not me, but Jesus, whom God
sees as the “perfect individual,” then ethically, religious belief is a sham:
I can remain as mired as ever in the radical evil I hoped to escape by
affirming a belief in salvation by grace.
Here, as in each of the three difficulties, the explanation of grace
commonly accepted by Christians, often promoted by their pastors,
and sometimes even defended by theologians, fails to protect believers
from experiencing potentially dire consequences for their ethical in-
tegrity. Such a belief may cause the religious person to be less able to
live a good life, rather than providing a newfound power to do so.
Belief in divine grace would then defeat the ethical purpose of being
religious. What readers of subsection C must constantly keep in mind,
in order to understand how and why Kant solves these difficulties, is
that any theoretical claims he makes are presented solely to show how
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philosophers well tuned to the workings of practical reason can protect
believers from deceiving themselves: people affirming a theological be-
lief in divine assistance (whatever the details may be) must supplement
it with an ethics of grace.
iii. kant’s antidote to moral laziness: solving the three
ethical difficulties
While the nature of the three difficulties Kant finds with any theology
of grace is well known and tends to be understood fairly accurately by
his interpreters, the depth and power of his solutions have never been
fully appreciated. In this section I shall fill that gap by explaining how
Kant’s solution to each difficulty relies on a basic hermeneutic strategy:
whereas those who interpret grace in an overly simplistic, nonperspec-
tival way end up compromising their ethical integrity, those who adopt
a perspectival interpretation are empowered to live a more authentic,
ethically motivated life. I shall focus mainly on Kant’s solution to the
third difficulty, for although it is the most important, it is also the most
obscure of his solutions, so it has been the easiest to dismiss without
serious consideration.
Kant’s response to all three difficulties is grounded in a perspectival
understanding of what religious belief entails: to be both genuinely
religious and fully rational, a person must believe in a God who per-
ceives the spatiotemporal details of human beings’ lives as a completed
whole, from a “noumenal” perspective unavailable to human beings.
By contrast, we human beings are limited to the “phenomenal” per-
spective, whereby we perceive only specific deeds and choices in iso-
lation from the totality that makes up a person’s moral life. By remem-
bering that they cannot have knowledge of the noumenal and that
human judgments regarding a person’s ethical condition must be
based on only phenomenal evidence, religious believers can effectively
protect themselves against ethical illusion. The ethical obstacles that
threaten to prevent a morally sensitive, rational person from believing
in divine grace can likewise be cleared away, provided we interpret
grace within this framework—a framework wholly consistent with (in-
deed, determined by) Kant’s Critical philosophy.
This perspectival framework, with its core distinction between the
phenomenal and the noumenal, lies at the heart not only of Kant’s
epistemology, moral philosophy, and aesthetics but also of his account
of the nature and purpose of religion. Of course, such references to
“noumenal reality” bear the brunt of much criticism of Kant’s entire
philosophy, including his theory of religion, with its apparent depen-
Kant’s Ethics of Grace
541
dence on the mysterious notion of a “timeless choice.” The phenomena-
noumena distinction is intimately bound up with a perspectival dis-
tinction Kant makes in the first Critique, between “empirical” reality,
the “transcendental” conditions that make that reality possible, and the
“transcendent” reality (if any) that lies out beyond the limits of our
possible knowledge. As I have argued elsewhere, many of these long-
standing problems can be cleared up by viewing these not as different
realities, but as different perspectives on (or ways of viewing) one and
the same reality, whose nature in and of itself is best called “human
experience.” With this perspectival framework in mind, I shall clarify
in Section IV what Kant means by his otherwise obscure concept of
noumenal choice. But first, let us examine how he applies this per-
spectival framework to solve the ethical difficulties confronting anyone
who believes in grace.
Kant solves the first difficulty by positing a divine perspective,
whereby God views a religious person’s entire life as a single, coherent
whole. By viewing a person’s life from this noumenal perspective, God
is able to take the progress that person makes over time as equivalent
to completing the goal of being perfect, even though each person (as
far as we know, from our limited, phenomenal perspective) dies before
the process of moral growth reaches full fruition. This hypothetical way
of thinking about God does not provide or require any theoretical
knowledge of God’s existence or nature, yet it empowers believers to
persevere in their moral life: even though they still occasionally make
choices contrary to the moral law, they can now understand how a
good God can “justify” them without merely turning a blind eye to
their postconversion evil. Kant’s account fulfills the task of an ethics
of grace by discouraging believers from becoming morally lazy as a
result of their belief in divine justification. If the rational grounding
of belief in justification is the empirical observation that a person’s
moral life is progressing, then this very belief will encourage the per-
son to work more diligently to make a real difference in the phenom-
enal world, for that is the only basis we human beings can use, on
Kant’s account, to assess our own eternal destiny. That is, people who
adopt Kant’s perspectival solution to the first difficulty not only are
rationally permitted to believe in the justifying power of divine grace,
but by doing so in the proper way they are also empowered to live
more ethically even though the doctrine they affirm remains theoret-
ically problematic.
Kant solves the first ethical problem that has historically plagued
those who affirm the doctrine of justification by grace by requiring
believers to treat evidence of sanctification (i.e., the phenomenal pro-
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cess of becoming a better person) as a necessary condition of believing
one has been (noumenally) justified by God. This makes moral laziness
incompatible with belief in grace. But how can a person know whether
or not any real (phenomenal) progress has been made? Kant answers
this question in his response to the second difficulty.
Kant observes that complete assurance of salvation is likely to be as
detrimental to a believer’s moral condition as a total lack of any basis
for confidence would be. Rational persons who presume to know God
has irreversibly saved them might as well choose to relax and live a
self-centered, essentially evil life, since their eternal destiny is a “done
deal.” Divine assistance would then have an unethical result, and the
morally sensitive rational person would have to regard grace as yet
another example of our tendency to be duped by the radical evil that
infects human reason at its root. Likewise, those who deny the possi-
bility of possessing any evidence as to whether or not they are saved
would be likely to stop trying to live a good life. Kant solves this dif-
ficulty by appealing once again to his perspectival framework, requir-
ing believers to focus on their phenomenal choices rather than claim-
ing to have knowledge of a noumenal reality that is beyond human
grasp. Certainty on such matters is possible only from God’s perspec-
tive, a perspective we human beings can never hope to adopt. Instead,
religious believers must always assess the eternal status of their dispo-
sition by appealing to life conduct, for this phenomenal perspective
on the status of moral character is the only means we have for obtain-
ing evidence of whether or not we have been transformed by God’s
grace. That our assessments will always remain imperfect is not ethi-
cally problematic, for the goal of focusing on continual progress is not
to obtain certainty of salvation, but to guard against moral laziness.
The interpretation of divine grace Kant defended in response to the
first difficulty gives believers who remain morally diligent (i.e., those
who think they observe progress toward the goal of perfection in their
experience since conversion) a reason to hope that from God’s point
of view their salvation is secure. Such hope thereby empowers religious
believers to work even harder, without tempting them (as do either of
the extreme alternatives) to stop working on moral self-improvement.
This solves the second difficulty by enabling a person to continue be-
lieving in the transforming efficacy of divine grace, without having an
excuse to be morally lazy, as a claim to certainty would provide. By
requiring those who believe in grace to regard it as noumenal, thus
appealing only to the (uncertain) phenomenal evidence of moral im-
provement as a basis for religious hope, Kant remains well within the
limits of knowledge set by the first Critique.
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Kant’s response to the third difficulty is less straightforward; if read
theologically, it appears at first to be a concocted solution with no
tangible effect on a believer’s practical empowerment. Yet when taken
as the third step in a systematic attempt to construct an ethics of grace,
it turns out to be the most profound of the three solutions. Along with
orthodox Christian theologians, Kant assumes that the ethical require-
ments of divine justice can be satisfied only if some punishment is dealt
out to compensate for the evil done prior to a person’s conversion
(Religion, 72–74) and that conversion entails the believer becoming a
“new person” from the moral standpoint, even though from the stand-
point of one’s physical nature, one remains the self-same individual.
We would expect to account for the timing of God’s punishment by
locating it either before or after the conversion experience (73); but
Kant rejects both options. Human experience fails to provide consis-
tent evidence that God punishes evil-hearted people directly for their
evil; often, those who choose to do evil seem happier than good people,
for they intentionally pursue their own happiness before considering the
demands of the moral law.27 Moreover, the price for preconversion evil
cannot have been paid by suffering endured before conversion, because
this would imply that an evil-hearted person (one who has not expe-
rienced conversion) is in no need of God’s grace, having already paid
the price for the evil done! Yet the punishment also cannot occur after
conversion, because at this point, a genuinely converted person has a
good disposition and is thereby not worthy of being judged evil. In the
process of solving the first difficulty Kant has already explained how a
just and righteous God could save such a person without needing to
administer any postconversion punishment.
In typical Critical fashion, Kant solves this dilemma by appealing to
a middle way hidden between the two extremes: if the punishment that
atones for a person’s preconversion evil can occur neither before nor
after the person’s conversion, it must “be thought as commensurate
with this change and carried out in the state of the change of mentality
itself” (Religion, 73). What could this mean? For if conversion involves
a change of disposition, and if its noumenal nature means that only
God has unobstructed access to the human disposition, then how could
a “change” in this “timeless” aspect of our nature have an effect in the
phenomenal world? Kant’s argument appears to be as meaningless as
the worst examples of scholastic hairsplitting; if we read this as an
attempt to construct a theology of grace, he might as well be asking
27 Kant defines “wickedness” as “revers[ing] the moral order in regard to the incentives of
a free power of choice” (Religion, 30), where the proper order of incentives is respect for the
moral law, followed by happiness.
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us to decide how many angels can stand together on the head of a
pin! Unfortunately, Kant offers precious little clue as to what he has
in mind, so not surprisingly, interpreters tend to reject this and all his
solutions as “ambiguous” and “unsatisfactory.”28
Interpreting Kant’s third solution as the climax of his defense of an
ethics of grace gives it considerably more practical force. We can then
understand his argument as follows: the experience of conversion just
is the deeply painful choice to submit one’s ethical decision-making
processes to a new foundational principle. The “old person” was some-
one for whom evil choices tended to cause intense pleasure, while no
pain seemed more unbearable than being forced to do a good deed
one would rather avoid. Guilt is a remote and rare feeling for such a
person. For the “new person,” by contrast, evil choices cause a pain of
guilt more intense than anything the “old person” ever experienced.
While all human persons tend to feel some of the “pain” Kant identifies
as respect for the moral law—for even the most deeply spiritual per-
sons have physical and sensuously conditioned inclinations—the pri-
mary mark of growth in one’s moral life (or of sanctification in one’s
religious life) is that this pain gradually develops into a deep content-
ment when one has decided (noumenally) to base one’s moral choices
on the good principle.29 Since the experience of conversion is not nec-
essarily sudden, but may extend over a lengthy portion of a person’s
life, the existence of such “pain” can be taken as empirical evidence
that one is still “in the state” of undergoing such a phenomenal change
(i.e., of being sanctified).
An easily neglected aspect of Kant’s solution to the third difficulty
is that, even though he depicts the crucial pain and suffering under
consideration as happening during the conversion experience, he also
says the new, postconversion person suffers vicariously on behalf of the
old, preconversion person. In deciding, once and for all, to aim at
living a virtuous life, a person undergoing a conversion agrees to ex-
perience the aforementioned pain of ever-increasing guilt;30 for, the
closer one comes to being holy (or sanctified), the more one becomes
28 Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 111, 122, and passim. Wood, for example, claims the question
Kant asks here “is not to the point” (Kant’s Moral Religion, 235), though he then argues that
important theological insights can be gleaned from Kant’s discussion.
29 In Critique of Practical Reason (trans. Werner S. Pluhar [Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002], 73)
Kant writes: “the moral law as determining basis of the will . . . must bring about a feeling
that can be called pain.” He goes on to describe this pain as a need to eclipse the inclinations
of self-love when we choose to give precedence to the principle of respect for persons that
is inherent in the moral law.
30 Apparently, this agreement is “timeless,” so it does not necessarily enter consciously into
the believer’s mind during the process of conversion. I attempt to make sense of this claim,
arguably the most problematic in all of Kant’s philosophy of religion, in Section IV.
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aware of the depths of one’s failings. Kant’s claim is that the painful
awareness accompanying a conversion experience, that my moral dis-
position must be turned completely around in order for me to receive
divine grace, constitutes the phenomenal “punishment” that enables
God to forgive my preconversion evil. Focusing on this deeply painful
experience, whereby a person realizes his or her past life has been so
mired in evil that the only hope is to “die” (82) to “the old human
being” (74) and commit oneself, with God’s help, to carrying one’s
cross down the never-ending path of self-improvement (73–78), en-
ables us to understand how God can forgive preconversion evil while
avoiding the danger of allowing believers to be morally lazy. Kant is
suggesting, therefore, that the empirical evidence that a person has
been morally receptive to the atoning work of Jesus (or any other theo-
logical basis for divine grace) is that the person must seek to conduct
his or her life in a manner that amounts to the imitation of Christ’s
sufferings—a theme he develops further in section two of the Second
Piece. Unfortunately, examining the precise nature of this pain and
the psychology of conversion it implies is beyond the scope of the pres-
ent essay. Let it suffice to say that, in order to overcome the ethical
difficulty created by a belief in justification, we must acknowledge the
importance of the psychologically painful experience of sanctification
as evidence that the required (noumenal) change has occurred. While
this is consistent with the position many of the great Christian theo-
logians have defended down through the centuries,31 it is lost in much
of the popular theology that is the target of Kant’s criticism in Religion.
iv. kant’s affirmation of grace as a noumenal idea with
religious power
Peter Byrne’s recent discussion of Kant’s hesitancy in affirming a qual-
ified doctrine of grace for rational religion (see Sec. I) portrays Kant’s
God as devoid of any real power to influence the way religious believers
conduct their lives. Against this claim, I have argued that Kant’s posi-
tion, at least in the key passage interpreted in Sections II–III, has an
ethical emphasis that gives it far more practical power than Byrne ac-
knowledges. What remains is to show how Kant’s controversial appeal
to the noumenal origin of grace serves to clear away the ethical obsta-
cles that might otherwise obstruct a practical justification for believing
in grace as a real power.
31 A typical example is the Catholic theologian Louis de Molina (1535–1600). For other
examples, see Rossi, “Reading Kant.”
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Although Byrne does not discuss Kant’s account of the three diffi-
culties in any detail, his three types of grace are related, at least loosely,
to Kant’s three solutions. Byrne’s account of distributive grace in Re-
ligion focuses on the First Piece and thus makes no reference to any-
thing Kant defends explicitly in the Second Piece; nevertheless, those
familiar with the second Critique may detect a parallel between Kant’s
solution to the first difficulty (how God can forgive good-hearted peo-
ple for their remaining imperfections) and the moral-religious situa-
tion whereby God distributes happiness to justified believers.32
Byrne describes “justifying grace” as God making a converted person
perfect even though the person “is still left with guilt from the bad
acts he performed while an imperfect being.”33 As such, this type of
grace obviously refers to the Christian doctrine of vicarious atonement
and is precisely the source of Kant’s third difficulty. Unfortunately,
Byrne makes no effort to relate his account of Kantian justifying grace
to Kant’s solution to this difficulty. Yet, as I have argued in Section III,
Kant’s solution to the third difficulty relates as much to the traditional
doctrine of sanctification as to justification, for the “difficulty” here is
not how salvation (i.e., justification) itself is possible, but how religious
believers compensate for past evil through their painful commitment
to self-improvement—a task that corresponds closely to what theolo-
gians typically call “sanctification.”
Byrne covers sanctification under the heading “transforming grace,”
describing it as “the alleged divine ability and willingness materially to
assist in transforming the evil human being into the good human be-
ing.”34 On Byrne’s reading, Kant has no serious interest in either trans-
forming grace or justifying grace, except insofar as these are in some
sense “analogous” to distributive grace.35 By setting up his own three-
32 Although it can be read into the text, Kant’s account does not require such an implicit
connection. Divine grace as Kant describes it when solving the first difficulty has no direct
dependence on the distribution of happiness. Just as Kant never uses the term “grace” in the
second Critique to describe the process whereby everyone ends up with happiness in direct
proportion to their virtue, in Religion he never says the justified believer deserves to receive
from God a gift of happiness in proportion to the level of virtue attained. Kant made a valiant
effort (see Religion, 14) to keep the validity of his conclusions in Religion distinct from the
validity of the conclusions of the three Critiques. My point in the text is only that a potential
parallel exists here that Byrne overlooked.
33 Byrne, Kant on God, 140.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 141. Byrne here mentions Kant’s definition of grace (Religion, 75n), quoted above
in Sec. II. Later, Byrne devotes part of one paragraph (Kant on God, 150) to a brief discussion
of several quotations from Kant’s subsection C. But nowhere does Byrne acknowledge that
Kant’s attempt to solve these difficulties constitutes his most detailed discussion of how belief
in grace can be morally empowering. In Byrne’s case this oversight appears to have resulted
from his overemphasis on the alleged role of the highest good in Religion: Kant mentions
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fold distinction, reading it into Kant’s text, then giving only passing
attention to the very section of Religion where Kant offers his most
powerful defense of the relevant theories,36 Byrne conflates aspects of
grace that Kant himself distinguishes quite clearly. Kant addresses
Byrne’s transforming grace in solving both his first and second diffi-
culties, where he clarifies that a belief in God’s transforming grace is
possible (i.e., it need not give rise to an ethically problematic position)
as long as the believer does not count on such transformation as an
excuse for moral laziness, but rather views the transformation as a mo-
tivating force that empowers a person to continue working on moral
improvement. An appeal to transforming (i.e., noumenal) grace, ac-
cording to Kant, is needed to compensate for what we ourselves, in
our postconversion state, remain unable to complete during the pro-
cess of phenomenal self-improvement.
A fair assessment of Kant’s defense of the meaningfulness of divine
grace in the face of the three difficulties requires a clear understanding
of the noumenal language he uses in its defense, especially his several
references to a mysterious, “timeless” choice. Let us therefore examine
Kant’s use of such language in hopes of making sense of it. Noumenal
acts of timeless choice, Kant claims, must be presupposed to explain
both how our disposition can start out evil and how a conversion to
the good is possible. We can therefore take as paradigmatic what Kant
says about the former noumenal choice. Whatever “act of freedom”
(Religion, 21) must be inferred, in order to explain how we started out
with an evil propensity, must have a status comparable to any follow-
up “change of mentality” (Sinnesa¨nderung ; 66, 73–74, 83, 88) that suc-
ceeds in reversing that inner tendency.
Toward the end of the First Piece, Kant, when attempting to distin-
guish his theory of the rational origin of evil from the traditional theo-
logical interpretation of original sin as a temporal origin of evil, writes:
Every evil action must be regarded, when one seeks its rational origin, as if
the human being had fallen into it directly from the state of innocence. For
however his previous conduct may have been, and of whatever kind may be
the natural causes influencing him, and likewise whether they are to be found
within or outside him, his action is nonetheless free and not determined by
any of these causes, and it therefore can and must always be judged as an
original use of his power of choice. He should have refrained from the action,
whatever the circumstances of time and the connections in which he may have
been; for through no cause in the world can he cease to be a freely acting
the latter concept only a few times (e.g., Religion, 97) and never in a way that would make
distribution of happiness in proportion to virtue a necessary feature of his argument.
36 Byrne’s passing attention to subsection C is discussed briefly in the previous footnote.
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being. It is indeed rightly said that one imputes to the human being also the
consequences arising from his former free but unlawful acts; but this means only
that one has no need to venture into the subterfuge of establishing whether
the consequences may be free or not, because, in the admittedly free action
that was their cause, sufficient ground for imputation is already available. (Re-
ligion, 41)
Given that Kantian freedom is a noumenal reality, not conditioned by
phenomenal causes and effects, the “free action” Kant refers to here
is obviously an example of noumenal (or timeless) choice. He is not
saying our empirical situation is wholly irrelevant, but only that, when
assessing a person’s moral character (based as it is on what is universal
in human nature), our usual, phenomenal perspective on our actions
cannot show us the disposition as such. The temporal effects of our
free choice may be relevant to an earthly judge when determining the
precise extent of our accountability for an evil (or good) act; but this
is not what determines the bare (noumenal) fact that we are account-
able.
The passage above reveals that the elusive timeless “action” whereby
we choose the evil propensity is not some mysterious prebirth experi-
ence that takes place in an imaginary (mythical) realm beyond time
and space. Rather, Kant’s argument is that each and every moral choice
can be viewed from two perspectives: viewed transcendentally, a moral
action is grounded in a noumenal choice that makes us responsible
for whatever we end up doing to implement that choice; viewed em-
pirically, the same action takes place in time and space and may be
influenced by all manner of exigencies. Insofar as such empirical
causes are beyond our control, they may influence how accountable
we are.37 Nevertheless, there are not two choices, nor two acts, but only
one choice, one act that we can interpret from two perspectives. The
same must be true of the free act whereby a person brings about a
Sinnesa¨nderung.
On this perspectival interpretation, “timeless” and “noumenal” refer
not to some mysterious other world, but to a special way of viewing the
37 In law courts, for example, a person who has been convicted of committing a crime is
likely to receive a lighter sentence (or possibly none at all) if the judge is persuaded that
causal factors diminished (or completely annulled) the person’s ability to make a free choice.
One who murders in a sudden fit of uncontrollable insanity is deemed less accountable than
one who murders after making a cold, calculating decision. While the literature on Kant’s
theory of causation is massive, relatively little of it examines this most interesting question of
how empirical causes can affect moral responsibility. See, e.g., Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims
of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 237–66. Michael Friedman
(“Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant,
ed. Paul Guyer [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992], 193 n. 7) lists fifteen influ-
ential publications on Kantian causality.
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ordinary moral choices we make while living our phenomenal lives.
Kant concludes the above-quoted paragraph by insisting (Religion, 41):
“We therefore cannot inquire into the temporal origin of this deed,
but must inquire merely into its rational origin, in order thereafter to
determine and, if possible, explain the propensity, if there is one, i.e.,
the subjective universal basis for the admission of a transgression into
our maxim.” Any talk of a free choice to correct this propensity to evil
in our nature must likewise be interpreted as an appeal to a change
in our underlying moral character, our disposition. A good example of
Kant’s appeal to such a perspectival interpretation of grace comes in
the footnote he appends to the last paragraph dealing with the third
difficulty in subsection C.
In a footnote clarifying his solution to the third difficulty, Kant em-
phasizes how our dual nature requires us to adopt two perspectives on
punishment and justification:
Even the purest moral disposition still produces in the human being, as a being
of the world, nothing more than a continual becoming of a subject who is
pleasing to God in terms of the deed (which is found in the world of sense).
In terms of quality this disposition (since it must be thought as suprasensibly
based) ought to and can indeed be holy and conforming to the disposition of
the human being’s archetype; in terms of degree—as it reveals itself in ac-
tions—it always remains deficient and infinitely far removed from that arche-
type’s disposition. In spite of this, because this disposition contains the basis
for continual progress in compensating for this deficiency, it takes the place of
the deed in its perfection. (Religion, 74n–75n)
Viewed from the noumenal perspective of its supersensible nature, the
“quality” of our moral nature “can indeed be holy and conforming to
the disposition of the human being’s archetype.” Yet, viewed from the
phenomenal perspective of the “degree” of conformity apparent in
one’s day-to-day actions, a person’s moral status is (at best) in a per-
petual process of improvement, for it always falls short of the goal of
being “pleasing to God”—both “in life on earth” and “perhaps also in
all future times and in all worlds” (75). The perfected disposition
atones for this “deficiency” in life conduct by standing in place of such
“continual progress” in a person’s actions, though only when viewed
from God’s perspective—something we human beings can never do in
any given case.
Kant’s long footnote concludes by observing, ironically, that good-
hearted persons will experience divine punishment as both cause and
effect of their good life conduct, as well as of their “contentment” with
the paradoxes involved in living a moral life (Religion, 75n):
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Of this [i.e., the moral agent’s “willing reception of those ills and sufferings
as so many occasions for testing and practicing his disposition toward the
good”] even that punishment is the effect and simultaneously the cause, and
hence is so also of that satisfaction and moral happiness which consists in the
consciousness of his progress in the good (which is one with the act of the
abandonment of evil). In the old disposition, by contrast, the very same ills
would have to have not only counted as punishments but also been sensed as
such, because even considered as mere ills they are still directly opposed to
what the human being in such a disposition makes his single goal by way of
physical happiness.
Because the noumenal “act of the abandonment of evil” is “one with”
a person’s “consciousness of his [phenomenal] progress in the good,”
one who recognizes this unity may regard this act as entailing a divine
“punishment” that paradoxically produces “moral happiness” despite
the earthly “ills” a good person must endure. By contrast, when those
who remain mired in an evil disposition are deprived of fulfilled incli-
nations, they adopt only the phenomenal perspective, counting “the
very same ills . . . as punishments,” for this is how they have “been
sensed” (i.e., how they appear to one’s physical nature); the “single
goal” for such persons is to obtain the “physical happiness” that is
possible only by fulfilling inclinations. The best way to assess whether
one’s underlying disposition is good or evil is to identify which of these
opposing attitudes one adopts toward the sufferings and ills experi-
enced in this life.
Properly understanding the subtlety of Kant’s suggestion that the
punishment for past evil occurs during the change of heart enables us
to clarify what he thinks a noumenal act is. The solution to the third
difficulty implies that, in one sense, the required punishment takes
place all in a flash, at the (timeless) moment when a person’s dispo-
sition changes from evil to good. This solution to the problem of jus-
tification, Kant says, is “suprasensibly based” (i.e., noumenal). Yet, such
a change makes practical sense (i.e., avoids encouraging the moral
laziness at the root of all three ethical difficulties) only if we appeal
(with Kant) to the religious symbolism of an archetype who has already
completed this work.38 This archetype, viewed from the phenomenal
perspective, is a person who continually strives to realize in actions the
goodness already perfected in the disposition. To explain how a per-
son, following the archetype, can experience a “continual becoming”
38 Christians would identify Jesus as the best (and perhaps the only authentic) example.
However, interpreting Kant’s account of Jesus lies well beyond the scope of this article; see
Stephen R. Palmquist “Could Kant’s Jesus Be God?” an unpublished paper presented at the
Philosophy of Religion Conference held at Hong Kong Baptist University, February 2009.
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in (empirical) moral decision making, we must assume a “one-off deci-
sion” has been made from the noumenal perspective, a religious con-
version whereby the person adopts a new way of interpreting the pain
and suffering of living an earthly life; while this change is likely to
increase one’s suffering (viewed phenomenally), the converted person
gradually learns (through faith in the efficacy of God’s noumenal per-
spective) to interpret such experiences not as painful but with con-
tentment and joy.
Kant sometimes seems to affirm the traditional Christian belief that
Jesus plays a unique role in the human race’s ability to achieve such a
moral revolution (e.g., Religion 80, 158–62) and that each person’s sal-
vation somehow (at least in a symbolic sense) depends on Jesus’s ac-
complishment (60–62, 119); yet he also affirms the Enlightenment
philosophical belief that each person still has a duty to make the good
principle the sovereign force in his or her will. The divine gift of the
archetype may be free, but believers must do something to appropriate
the righteousness it offers as their own. Kant’s portrayal of grace as a
noumenal idea in subsection C need not be dismissed as a muddle of
lazy thinking; nor is it merely a “wild card” appeal to wishful thinking,
comparable to the proverbial pink elephant. Instead, it functions as an
ethical safety measure intended to supplement any Christian (or other)
theology of grace: by forcing them to admit ignorance of how grace
operates, Kant’s position prevents believers from falling victim to an
unethical application of theological doctrine, thereby providing them
with the moral empowerment needed to persevere on the path of
goodness. Viewing grace as a noumenal idea empowers believers by
reminding them to ground the belief that they have received grace on
the phenomenal evidence of their changed life conduct. In this way,
Kant can both uphold salvation by grace alone (noumenally) and insist
that believers must nevertheless endeavor to lead good lives (phenom-
enally).
Kant’s solution to the three difficulties inherent in any belief in
grace is considerably richer, and more amenable to a theology that
offers believers access to a real, life-transforming power, than past in-
terpreters have recognized. While Byrne’s recent efforts to examine
and assess Kant’s appeal to divine assistance are a refreshing alternative
to the more negatively inclined interpretations of the past, they do not
go far enough along the path forged by scholars such as Quinn and
Marin˜a. The interpretive key to resolving the conundrums of Kant’s
account is to recognize that he neither reduces grace to an optional
extra, nor (even worse) dismisses it as nothing but the ravings of en-
thusiastic religious fanatics; rather, he rescues it from a far more per-
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ilous fate, whereby belief in divine assistance encourages moral lazi-
ness, thus becoming a self-deceptive tool of radical evil that keeps one
mired in an unethical way of life. Kant’s appeal to the noumenal
guards against such laziness, by requiring that we human beings must
view our lives from the “progress” perspective, yet permitting us to
hope God views our lives from the perspective of “the whole.” The
conduct we interpret as phenomenal progress does not “save” a person;
it only provides the evidence that a noumenal change, an inner “rev-
olution” (Religion, 47–48) has taken place; the divine wisdom has ar-
ranged the human situation so that we cannot know this noumenal
reality, for this necessary ignorance is precisely what prevents us from
being morally lazy. Kant is a philosopher, not a theologian, so he never
claims to explain how grace happens; but neither does he deny the
possibility of Christian (or other forms of) salvation. Rather, he brings
together the warring parties he sees as his readers (theologians or re-
ligious believers who disdain philosophy on the one hand and irrelig-
ious philosophers or atheists on the other) by explaining how a person
can believe in divine grace, even salvation by faith in the atoning sac-
rifice of Jesus, without becoming unethical.
Quinn raises two objections to Kant’s theory that Marin˜a addresses,
but only partially resolves. First, “Kantian justification is not merely
mysterious; it is, on Kantian principles, utterly unjustified.”39 But if
Kant’s aim is not to theologize about grace, this objection is misplaced;
Kant merely needs to show how someone who chooses to believe in
grace (whatever their reasons may be!) can avoid moral laziness. Ulti-
mately for Kant, the question of human salvation can be answered by
God alone. Second, Quinn claims that on Kantian principles, if God
declares that a person who still sometimes sins is nevertheless righ-
teous, this implies a “laxness” in divine justice that “would be a moral
outrage.”40 However, this objection neglects the perspectival grounding
of Kant’s argument. Such an objection only holds in the case of human
judges, who must depend on phenomenal evidence alone.41 Kant’s God
does not base the decree of righteousness on phenomenal evidence;
only we do that! God’s decree of righteousness must be based on a
noumenal disposition that (for a converted person) fully complies with
the moral law and therefore involves no injustice on God’s part.
Similarly, Adams objects: “Kant really has no explanation of how
moral progress could deserve to be counted as perfected holiness.”42
39 Quinn, “Christian Atonement and Kantian Justification,” 457.
40 Ibid., 458.
41 The common practice of law courts, discussed in n. 37 above, is a case in point.
42 Adams, “Introduction,” xxiv.
Kant’s Ethics of Grace
553
Thus he poignantly asks, “What’s the point of imputed righteousness
for a Kantian?” The point, I have argued, is that belief in such (pre-
venient!) grace empowers a good-hearted person to continue the strug-
gle toward phenomenal perfection. Adams misleadingly thinks Kant’s
appeal to progress requires a mixture of good and evil influences on
the noumenal level that Kant, with his previously defended “rigorist”
stance, requiring a person’s disposition always to be “either morally
good or morally evil” and never both (Religion, 22), would firmly reject.
Adams thinks the claim that the postconversion noumenal self is en-
tirely good, from God’s perspective, amounts to “denying the reality of
sin and classifying it as merely an appearance.”43 Yet this is no more
true for Kant than it is for traditional Christian doctrine. Like the
latter, Kant’s position is that sin (radical evil) affects us on two levels:
before conversion, it has a noumenal grip on our disposition and thus
total control over our phenomenal choices; but after conversion, God
(accurately) views the perfected disposition as sinless, even though we
continue to struggle in our phenomenal choices as we progress toward
the good. Adams is correct to say Kant places his hope in phenomenal
“progress” as “the temporal expression of the timeless reality”;44 his
mistake is to think this implies that a continuing struggle exists at the
noumenal level as well.
Properly understood, belief in grace is not to be dismissed as an
aberration or a sign of undue weakness, but affirmed as the goal of
Kant’s whole argument in Religion, and at least consistent with (if not
also grounded by) his Critical System.45 That goal is aptly expressed by
Kant himself, in the final sentence of Religion. Any doubt that Kant saw
himself as defending an ethics of grace should be dispelled when we
read his concluding claim to have confirmed the philosophical sound-
ness of Jesus’s central message in the Gospels (202), namely, “that the
right way to advance is not from grace to virtue, but rather from virtue
to grace.”
43 Ibid., xix.
44 Ibid., xix–xx.
45 For a defense of the latter claim, not argued here, see Palmquist, Kant’s Critical Religion,
esp. chaps. 7 and 12.
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